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Abstract. I argue that both digital and analog information are important in
the foundations of quantum physics. If it is possible for information present
in one system to become present in others without being erased in the original
system I will say that this information can be copied. I argue that copying is
important for understanding issues like causality and that all information that
can be copied is digital. I then explain that analog information that cannot
be copied can be understood in terms of decision theoretic probability. Finally,
I argue that these ideas can help explain the second law of thermodynamics.
The arrow of time we experience is the knowledge arrow of time – the present
contains more knowledge, that is, useful or explanatory information, than the
past. That knowledge is created by evolutionary processes that involve copying,
variation and selection and such processes increase entropy.
1. Introduction
The laws of physics allow the existence of computers and so allow the existence
of systems that can be described in a digital manner. To understand this fact
physicists start out with laws of motion that describe how systems evolve over
time. When physics is done in this way, the conclusion that the world is analog
seems irresistible. All of the laws of motion that have so far been formulated
and have survived testing, put continuous quantities front and center. General
relativity is a theory of continuous fields in a continuous space-time, as is quantum
field theory.
In this view, digital computation is a completely derivative phenomenon. It just
so happens that it’s possible to arrange for a system to have two stable states. It
is also simply a remarkable coincidence that we can put a bunch of these ‘bits’
together and do computations with them, as is the fact that such systems can
simulate any other system in quantum mechanics [1]. I think that this view of
the status of computation and so of digital quantities within physics is misleading.
There is nothing outside the universe (the whole of physical reality) and so all of
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the facts about the way the world works have to be instantiated in information that
different systems contain about one another. If information I is initially instanti-
ated only in system A and it then spreads to system B while remaining accessible
in system A, I will say that the information I has been copied. I shall argue that
copying is very important for understanding how physical reality works, that only
digital information can be copied according to quantum mechanics, which is the
most fundamental theory available to us 1. Analog information in quantum me-
chanics is information that can’t be copied and dictates how we ought to bet on
the outcomes of experiments. I then argue that these ideas can help explain the
second law of thermodynamics. The arrow of time we experience is the knowledge
arrow of time. Knowledge is created by evolutionary processes that involve copy-
ing, variation and selection. Those processes place constraints on the initial and
final state of a knowledge creating system that imply that either its entropy grows
over time or it increases the entropy of the environment.
2. Digital and analog information in quantum mechanics
Let’s suppose that I want to explain how a star exploding billions of years ago
contributed to the formation of the solar system. This is about as messy, difficult
and complicated as any causal explanation can be. The star exploded and this
produced a cloud of gas and part of that gas cloud collapsed as a result of gravity,
pressure waves from other exploding stars and so on to form the sun and the
solar system. The cloud of atoms that formed the solar system could be traced
back in part to that earlier exploding star. So it must be possible to identify that
group of atoms over time at least until we reach the point where they were part
of that earlier star. Furthermore, it must be possible for that group of atoms to
contain some information about the star that produced them that can be copied so
that they leave behind information that can help to constrain our theories about
the formation of the solar system. If it was impossible in principle to identify
that group of atoms as coming from the earlier star, and if they left behind no
information that could be copied, it is unclear what it would mean to say that the
explosion of that star contributed to the formation of the solar system. So causal
explanations involve systems having identity over time and information that can
be copied.
1In this essay I will assume that quantum mechanics is universally valid and use the many
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics [2], according to which all of the objects around us
exist in multiple versions that are arranged in layers, each of which approximately resembles the
universe as described by classical physics.
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In the Heisenberg picture2, a quantum system S is represented by a representative
set of operatorsO1, O2 . . . that evolve over time while maintaining the same algebra
– so they evolve unitarily. That is
Oj(t2) = U
†(t2, t1)Oj(t2)U(t2, t1)
U(t2, t1)
†U(t2, t1) = 1ˆ, (1)
where 1ˆ is the unit observable and U(t2, t1) may be acting on systems other than
S.
A unitary operator can be written as
U =
∑
a
exp(iφa)Pˆa,
PˆaPˆb = δabPˆa. (2)
where the Pa form a discrete, i.e. - digital, set of projectors. Let the Xab be
operators such that
XabXcd = δbcXad,
Xaa = Pˆa, (3)
i.e. – they have the same algebra as Dirac dyadics.Then algebra gives
U †XcdU =
∑
ab
exp(i(φd − φc))Xcd, (4)
and so in general, U only leaves Xcd unchanged if c = d, i.e. - if Xcd is equal
to one of the projectors of U . If U is degenerate then the Xcd for values of c
and d for which U is degenerate remain unchanged, but on that particular set
of operators U acts as the identity, so nothing changes. So any operator U acts
on that remains unchanged. So for an operator that describes a quantum system
to remain unchanged when that system interacts non-trivially with other systems
it must be a sum of the projectors of the unitary operator acting on it. If that
operator only has real eigenvalues then it is an Hermitian operator – an observable.
Suppose that we have two systems S1 and S2 that interact between times t1 and
t2. Then if the unitary operator U describing their interaction has the form
U(t1, t2) =
∑
a,b
exp(iφab)Pˆ1a(t1)Pˆ2b(t1), (5)
where the subscripts 1 and 2 on the operators indicate that they represent descrip-
tors of S1 and S2 respectively, then U would leave
Aˆ1(t) =
∑
a
αaPˆ1a(t) (6)
2I use the Heisenberg picture here because it is more useful for tracking the flow of information
between quantum systems [3].
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unchanged. However, it would change X2cd(t)
X2cd(t2) = exp(i(φad − φac))Pˆ1a(t1)X2cd(t1). (7)
And so that interaction would make some of the operators describing S2 depend
on the projectors of Aˆ1(t1). Information about those projectors would be copied
from S1 to S2 . So only digital information can be copied in quantum mechanics.
Most formulations of quantum mechanics include continuous observables, such as
the position observable xˆ. However, there are no projectors onto individual values
of xˆ or other continuous observables, but there are projectors onto finite ranges of
possible values, see [7, Sections 3.3, 6.2 and 7.1]. So only information about finite
ranges of values can be copied and so the positions measured in real experiments
are not continuous, they are discrete, i.e. – they are digital.
However, copying is not the only possibility for transmission of information. In-
formation can be transferred from one system to another with the original system
being destroyed, e.g. – a photon being detected by a CCD. However, information
that is going to spread has to be copied. So after the photon has been destroyed
some information about it has to be copied if it is going to affect other systems.
Copying prevents quantum interference between different values of the copied ob-
servable as a result of decoherence. For a review of decoherence see [8]. So there
is a distinct version of a system associated with each of the copied projectors that
does not interact with the other versions. If between times t1 and t2 a particular
version v of a system S1 copies the information in the projectors Pˆ2b(t) an observ-
able Aˆ2(t) of S2 all of the information relevant to predicting what will happen is
in ρvAˆ(t), where ρv is a projector that represents the information in v before the
interaction. The reason for this is that, from (7), the projectors that S1 had at
t1, Pˆ1a(t1), one of which is ρv, change to Pˆ1a(t1)Pˆ2b(t1), so all of the information
about what will happen to v is contained inρvAˆ(t). As a result ρv only changes
when it is updated in the light of new information received by v: ρv is the relative
state of v.
This is where analog information starts to become relevant. Suppose that I am in
a particular relative state ρv and that I am going to measure an observable that
has projectors that do not commute with ρv. That measurement will have multiple
outcomes and I will experience each outcome separately, so I somehow have to take
all of them into account. In addition, ρvAˆ(t) does not just contain information
about which outcomes will happen. For example, if I am measuring a qubit and
ρv = |0〉〈0| and Aˆ(t) =
1
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)(〈0|+ 〈1|), then ρvAˆ(t) =
1
2
|0〉(〈0|+ 〈1|). And of
course we could set up systems to produce any real number from 0 to 1 at the front
of ρvAˆ(t). What does these numbers mean? David Deutsch [4] has argued that
we can use these numbers to make decisions that are rational in a specific decision
theoretic sense. When a decision theoretically rational agent in the relative state
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ρv measures an observable Aˆ(t) whose eigenvalues are the payoff he gets from each
outcome that the relevant future version of him will experience he bets as if he is
going to receive a payoff:
〈Aˆ(t)〉 = tr(ρvAˆ(t)). (8)
See also [5] and [6]. This decision theoretic approach to probability does not suffer
from the problems of the frequency theory of probability, which states that the
probability of an event x under circumstances y is the relative frequency of x over
an infinite number of identical experiments conducted in circumstances y. But an
infinite series of experiments is unphysical, so the frequency theory of probability
is problematic in a way that the decision theoretic approach is not.
3. Thermodynamics and knowledge
The second law of thermodynamics states that entropy always increases. Entropy
can be understood in terms of free energy. Free energy is energy that can be
used to do something useful, like the electricity powering my computer. Not all
energy is free: the air in my room consists of many molecules that collide with one
another, but the energy of those collisions cannot be used to do any useful work
unless another system with a different temperature is also used. The free energy
F and the entropy S are related by the equation F = E − TS, where E is a term
with dimensions of energy, so if E remains constant, F decreases as S increases.
The second law seems incompatible with the fact that the laws of motion of sys-
tems are often time symmetric. There are exceptions, like objects falling into
singularities in general relativity, but many interactions are not like this and it
is not obvious why the few interactions that are could explain the second law.
Many physicists say that the second law is an approximate, statistical law that
applies to macroscopic systems, see [9, Chapter 5 – 7]. We will never be able to
do the calculations required to make atoms undergo anti-entropic motion, which
is very improbable for most systems, so the second law will hold with a very high
probability, where probability is interpreted in terms of relative frequency. Since
the world is quantum mechanical, I will use the decision theoretic approach to
probability to avoid the problems of the frequency theory of probability.
However, suppose that our computers improved to the point where we could do
the relevant calculations, then could we interfere to undo the second law? This is
the concern raised by the Maxwell’s demon thought experiment. The experiment
involves two boxes of gas with rigid walls, box 1 and box 2, separated by a trapdoor
that can slide up frictionlessly. A molecule sized ‘demon’ hides in the box and slides
up the partition when a gas molecule is heading into box 1, and so the pressure
and temperature of the gas in box 1 increases and that in box 2 decreases. This
difference can be used to do useful work and so implies an increase in free energy
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and a reduction in entropy. This has given rise to a large literature, sampled in
[10]. Most exorcisms of the demon rely on Landauer’s principle: the idea that
deleting information has a thermodynamic cost, but Norton [11] has argued that
these discussions assume the second law applies to the information storage device
and so are circular.
The arrow of time we experience is the knowledge arrow of time. The present
contains records of the past but the past doesn’t contain records of the present
and it is this asymmetry that makes the present later than the past. These records
contain useful or explanatory information – knowledge. That knowledge is created
by evolutionary processes: processes that involve copying, variation and selection,
see [12, Chapters 1 and 7]. Biological evolution creates knowledge about how to
copy genes in a particular environmment. Human beings create knowledge about
a much wider set of problems, but our knowledge too is created by producing
variations on their current knowledge, selecting among those variations according
to whether they solve problems and then copying the variations that pass those
tests. I shall argue that this process increases entropy of subsystems of the universe.
This approach has some similarities to an argument by Maccone [13], who argued
that making records requires the growth of entropy and that the arrow of time is a
result of records being created. Jennings and Rudolf [14] criticised this argument
saying that Maccone assumed that classical mutual information was the correct
measure of information. To this, I would add that he assumed that the systems
involved are initially uncorrelated, i.e. - they are initially in a zero entropy state,
so the entropy can only increase. So I don’t think this is an adequate explanation
of the second law.
Calculations are usually easier in the Schrodinger picture, in which the state
changes unitarily, than in the Heisenberg picture, so I am going to switch to the
Schrodinger picture for the rest of the essay. In the Schrodinger picture, the state
ρ(t) is chosen so that it is equal to the Heisenberg picture state at the time t = 0
and evolves so that
ρ(t2) = U(t2, t1)ρ(t1)U
†(t2, t1). (9)
In terms of the Schrodinger state, the entropy of a quantum system is
S(ρ(t)) = tr(ρ(t)logρ(t)). (10)
The expectation values of the observables of a subsystem Sj of a larger system in
the state ρ(t) can be calculated from the reduced state of that system
ρj(t) = trnot Sjρ(t). (11)
The entropy of a subsystem can be calculated by putting its reduced state into
the formula for the von Neumann entropy.
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Now suppose that there are two variants of a piece of knowledge that are both
involved in a selection process3. It must be possible for them to be copied inde-
pendently, otherwise they can’t be selected independently. A test itself requires
knowledge and the pieces of knowledge to be tested must be subsystems of the
system doing the test. Consider a quantum system S with two subsystems S1 and
S2: the state of such a system can be written as
ρ(t) =
∑
a,b
pab|θab〉1212〈θab|, (12)
where
|θab〉1212〈θab| =
∑
cdef
λabcdλabef |c〉11〈e||d〉22〈f |, (13)
with |c〉11〈e||g〉11〈f | = δge|c〉11〈f |, |d〉22〈f ||g〉22〈h| = δfg|d〉22〈h| and the λabcd are
real numbers such that
∑
cd λ
2
abcd = 1. The λabcd can be assumed real due to the
Schmidt decomposition. The reduced states of S1 and S2 are
ρ1(t) =
∑
abcde
pabλabcdλabed|c〉11〈e|
ρ2(t) =
∑
abcdf
pabλabcdλabcf |d〉22〈f |. (14)
If the observable with projectors |θab〉1212〈θab| is measured then the state of S
remains unchanged. But if an observable with the same projectors as ρ1(t) or
ρ2(t) is measured then the state of S changes unless |θab〉1212〈θab| is a product of
those projectors. So any knowledge bearing system with two knowledge bearing
subsystems has a state that can be written as
ρ(t) =
∑
a,b
pab|a〉11〈a||b〉22〈b|. (15)
At the start of the selection process at t1 the state of S is
ρ(t1) =
∑
a,b
pab|a〉11〈a||b〉22〈b|. (16)
and the reduced states of S1 and S2 are
ρ(t1) =
∑
a,b
pab|a〉11〈a|
ρ(t1) =
∑
a,b
pab|b〉22〈b|. (17)
The selection process is a computation involving both S1 and S2. This computation
must be arranged using current knowledge, which is bound to be imperfect. So
even in the case of a classical, i.e. decoherent, computation it will be impossible
3The argument can be straightforwardly extended to more than two systems.
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for epistemological reasons to arrange for the computation to leave S1 and S2 in
a state of the form (16). A slightly more specific argument might help motivate
this idea. Knowledge of the orthogonal projectors of the density matrix must be
created by a process that produces conjectures about the state and then performing
tests of those conjectures. However, those tests do not give perfect access to
the expectation values of observables. If the same observables were measured
every time any particular version of the tester sees the relative frequencies of
different results. The larger the number of trials the more rational it will be
(in the decision theoretic sense) to expect that the relative frequencies are close
to the probabilities but the relative frequencies will not match the probabilities
perfectly, see [6, Section 4]. The fact that the analog information can’t be copied
is important for understanding this problem and so for understanding the second
law. The experiment is performed with imperfect knowledge from previous rounds
of conjecture and criticism and so the testers knowledge of what observable he
measures in any particular test will be imperfect and this introduces another source
of error. So if the selection process takes place between t1 and t2 the state at t2 is
of the form
ρ(t2) =
∑
a,b
pab|θab〉1212〈θab|, (18)
where
|θab〉1212〈θab| =
∑
cdef
λabcdλabef |c〉11〈e||d〉22〈f |. (19)
The reduced states of the subsystems at t2 are
ρ1(t2) =
∑
abcde
pabλabcdλabed|c〉11〈e|
ρ2(t2) =
∑
abcdf
pabλabcdλabcf |d〉22〈f |. (20)
The expectation values of observables of S1 are now correlated with those of S2
and they contain information about one another that they did not contain before
the interaction and that is what constitutes t2 being later than t1 in this theory.
Let
|νc〉11〈νc| =
∑
de
ξcdξce|d〉11〈e| (21)
where the ξcd are real c-numbers such that
∑
d ξcdξfd = δcf , then the |νc〉11〈νc| are
an orthogonal set of projectors and
∑
c
|νc〉11〈νc|ρ1(t1)|νc〉11〈νc| =
∑
abcde
pabξcdξce|d〉11〈e|. (22)
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Equation (22) is of the same form as equation (20). It can be shown that [16,
Theorem 11.9, p. 515]:
S(
∑
c
|νc〉11〈νc|ρ1(t1)|νc〉11〈νc|) ≥ S(ρ1(t1)). (23)
So
S(ρ1(t2)) ≥ S(ρ1(t1)),
S(ρ2(t2)) ≥ S(ρ2(t1)). (24)
After the computation has been performed the results have to be measured and
this too will increase entropy by a similar argument. The only ways to decrease the
entropy increase in the knowledge bearing system would be for the interaction to
be reversed, which would delete the acquired knowledge, or to export the entropy
to another system. But this would just mean that the entropy of some other
system would increase and so it would not allow the evasion of the second law. So
the growth of knowledge is correlated with the growth of entropy.
4. Conclusion
Both analog and digital information are important in physics. All information
that can be copied is digital, but this information does not capture all of the
information in a system and the rest is characterised by analog information, which
acts as decision theoretic probability. Together they help to explain the second law
of thermodynamics. The digital information that can be copied contains knowledge
that explains the arrow of time. The analog information that cannot be copied
contributes to making knowledge imperfect, and this contributes to the growth of
entropy.
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